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ABSTRACT
Previous studies of the announcement effects of relaxing administrative and legislative restraints
show that signal events leading up to the enactment of the Financial Services Modernization Act
(FSMA) increased the prices of several classes of financial-institution stocks.  An unsettled question
is whether the gains observed for these stocks arise mainly from projected increases in efficiency or
from reductions in customer or competitor bargaining power.  This paper documents that the value
increase came at the expense of customers and competitors.  The stock prices of credit-constrained
customers declined during FSMA event windows and experienced significant increases in beta in
the wake of its enactment.  These findings reinforce evidence in the literature on bank mergers that
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WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM ENACTING THE FINANCIAL 
MODERNIZATION STATUTE 
 
Previous studies of the announcement effects of relaxing administrative and legislative restraints 
show that signal events leading up to the enactment of the Financial Services Modernization Act 
(FSMA) increased the prices of several classes of financial-institution stocks. An unsettled 
question is whether the gains observed for these stocks arise from projected increases in 
efficiency or from reductions in customer or competitor bargaining power. This paper documents 
that the value increase came at the expense of customers and competitors.  The stock prices of 
credit-constrained customers declined during FSMA event windows and experienced significant 
increases in beta in the wake of its enactment.  These findings reinforce evidence in the literature 




1.  Introduction 
 
  The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (FSMA) authorized the reciprocal 
entry of U.S. banks, securities firms, and insurance companies into one another’s 
signature product lines.  FSMA repealed Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Act 
restrictions on financial firms’ ability to engage in one another’s traditional activities, and 
also repealed limitations on bank insurance activities imposed by the National Banking 
Acts of 1864 and 1916.
1    
     At the signing of the bill, Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers predicted that the 
bill would benefit “American consumers, business and the national economy.”  However, 
given how long the previous regime survived, it is hard to believe that FSMA was truly a 
win-win proposition for all sectors of the economy.  Regulatory adjustments usually 
generate a distribution of sectoral wins and losses and economic theory suggests that 
competitors and credit-constrained customers might suffer losses. 
  Analytically, sectoral wins would register as increased stock values and/or lower risk 
exposures for constituent firms. Event returns generated by regulatory and legislative 
steps leading up to the enactment of FSMA indicate that the market anticipated that 
deregulation would benefit the financial sector.
2  This paper investigates whether 
financial organizations might have benefited more than—or even at the expense of—at 
                                                 
1 Also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), FSMA let stand restrictions set by the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) on nonfinancial firm entry into banking and on  bank expansion 
into “nonbanking” activities via subsidiary corporations. 
2 Previous event-study findings are summarized in section 4.2     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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least some customer and competitor sectors.  It also asks whether financial-sector benefits 
from relaxing product-market constraints come merely from projected improvements in 
efficiency or also from increased bargaining power in dealing with customers and 
regulators. 
  Operational and informational scale and scope economies from combining banking, 
insurance and securities activities within a single organization could simultaneously 
increase financial-sector profits and lower explicit customer funding costs.  Moreover, 
diversification into new product lines could improve implicit costs by increasing the 
safety and durability of individual banking organizations and better protect the 
investments that particular borrowers have made in bank relationships.   
  On the other hand, product-line extension is apt to increase the size of many banks 
and to strengthen their competitive position vis-à-vis public credit markets and differently 
chartered competitors.  Increased bank control over firms’ access to public and private 
securities markets could limit access to alternative funding sources for relationship 
customers, raise their funding costs, and curtail their investment spending.  Conglomerate 
institutions might be tempted to downplay relationship lending and to pass fewer 
informational quasi-rents through to repeat customers.  With fewer competitors vying for 
a customer’s business, resources devoted to analyzing customer-supplied information 
might fall and relationship customers might confront disadvantageous limit prices or 
pressure to liquidate collateral.  Finally, increases in banking-institution size and 
complexity could even undermine authorities’ ability to prevent securities or insurance 
risks from spilling onto the federal safety net, harming customers in their capacity as 
taxpayers.   
  We conduct statistical tests that show net benefits from FSMA differed for different 
categories of financial institutions and customers.  Some of the gains conveyed to the 
most favorably situated institutions (insurance companies and commercial banks) came 
as a transfer from stockholders in customer firms and competing institutions.  Within our 
sample of customer firms, salient events in FSMA’s legislative progress produced a 
2.53% cumulative decline in market capitalization.  Although very large customers may 
be said to have gained, credit-constrained customers—defined as younger, smaller firms 
with single banking relationships, no outstanding public debt and demonstrable financing     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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needs—experienced losses.  This sector’s mean abnormal return cumulates to -5.22% 
over FSMA progress events.  The corresponding mean loss for credit-unconstrained 
customers is only 1.68%.   Moreover, for credit-constrained customers, the post-FSMA 
systematic-risk coefficient (“beta”) rises by 0.20, while beta declines by 0.30 for the rest 
of the sample.  Cross-sectional regressions explaining individual-firm cumulative 
abnormal returns confirm that small and credit-constrained customers suffered significant 
harm. 
  To translate sample results into estimates of aggregate gains and losses for financial 
and nonfinancial firms, we make a heroic assumption.  This assumption is that median 
gain and loss rates experienced by sample firms would be representative of the medians 
for corresponding size classes used by the Census Bureau to report the size distribution of 
receipts at public and private firms.  On this assumption, calculations reproduced as an 
Appendix show that nonfinancial firms lost nine times as much from FSMA ($467 
billion) as financial firms gained ($52 billion).  Even if other estimation strategies could 
reduce this ratio substantially, the size of the implied deadweight loss indicates that 
proponents greatly overstated the efficiency benefits of FSMA.   
  Our findings reinforce anecdotal concerns expressed in the business press
3 and 
econometric evidence in the bank merger literature that ongoing consolidation in the 
banking industry is adversely affecting the ability of small firms to finance their growth 
opportunities.         
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the potential impact 
of financial modernization on customer welfare and derives testable hypotheses.  The 
paper’s statistical methods are described in section 3.  Section 4 presents and interprets 
our findings.  The final section summarizes our empirical results and relates them to other 
event studies of financial deregulation and banking consolidation. 
                                                 
3 A sampling of complaints expressed in response to the Fleet-BankBoston merger is assembled in 
Frieswick (2004):  “the merged bank doesn’t give you the total borrowing capacity that you used to have.” 
(Steven Wasserman, CFO of Symantec Corporation); “Banking is about relationships…If there’s a 
reduction in quality of service and our relationship team gets cut that could be a deal breaker.” (Regina 
Sommer, CFO of Netegrity);   “fewer available bank officers is less daunting to FleetBoston corporate 
customers that have diversified their bank relationships to prevent just such overdependence.” (Lee Kidder, 
director of wholesale-banking research at TowerGroup, and former head of commercial-loan operations at 
BankBoston).  Kidder also warns that future megabanks may have the bargaining power to increase fees 
and rates, change credit terms and corporate lending relationships, or choose not to renew a line of credit.       Draft of October 5, 2005     
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2.  Financial modernization and customer welfare 
  Modern banking theory assigns banks a special role in information production and 
monitoring.  The many points of contact a bank has with its repeat customers generate 
private information and mutual trust.  Diamond’s delegated-monitoring hypothesis 
envisions that banks either win access to inside information from repeat customers or 
uncover such information in the course of supporting and observing these customers’ 
loan and deposit business (Diamond, 1984). 
  Privileged information allows a bank to assess and to price the risk of lending to a 
relationship customer more accurately than the bank’s competitors can price risk.  For 
this reason, close ties with banks are valuable to healthy firms.
4  In principle, abilities or 
capacities that create extra-normal rents are intangible assets.  Their value can be 
expressed as a mutual claim to the capitalized flow (R) of reduced opportunity costs.  The 
outcome of a bilateral bargaining process (BP) allocates R partly to the relationship 
customer (RC) and partly to the bank (RB) (Kane and Malkiel, 1965)
5: 
R(BP) = RC(BP) + RB(BP).                 (1) 
  Changes in a customer’s RC can come either from changes in R or from changes in 
the balance of bargaining power.  Product-line extension can benefit customers by 
displacing high-cost specialized firms (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998 ) and by widening 
and lengthening the contact a bank has with its relationship customers.  Cross-selling 
opportunities can uncover new information, improve monitoring capabilities, and 
decrease agency costs, while expanding opportunities to use privileged information might 
unlock scale and scope economies in various service capacities.  Prior to FSMA, banks 
were allowed to establish separately incorporated security affiliates on a case-by-case 
basis (Section 20 banks and affiliates). Suggesting the possibility of scope economies, 
Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) and Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find that debt 
                                                 
4 Numerous studies confirm that banking relationships are valuable to firms.  James and Smith (2000) 
survey studies that proxy the value of banking relationships by borrower stock-price response to 
originations or renewals of credit facilities.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) are 
excellent examples of studies of how enhanced credit availability and lower funding costs correlate with 
close lending ties to banks.  
5Because R requires the cooperation of both parties in that they want to avoid outcomes that would 
eliminate the counterparty’s incentive to renew the relationship, equilibrium RC and RB should each be 
strictly positive.       Draft of October 5, 2005     
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underwritten by bank affiliates carried lower underwriting fees than comparable issues 
underwritten by investment banks.   
  On the other hand, product-line expansion also increases asset size.  Well-known 
“size effects” in lending predict that the formation of larger, more complex banking 
institutions might adversely affect small customers.  Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and 
Stein (2005) show that small banks are more likely than large banks to extend loans to 
borrowers that lack formal records.  They also find that small-bank lending travels over 
shorter distances, capturing localized knowledge of borrower condition.  Evidence 
reviewed by Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) shows that a threshold asset size exists 
at which banks begin to channel an increasing proportion of their lending to large firms.  
Stein (2002) and Berger and Udell (2002) attribute this phenomenon to bureaucratic 
blockages in the movement of customer information across components of large and 
complex banks.  These blockages result in the use of different technologies for lending to 
large and small firms.  Both papers portray large banking organizations as favoring 
transaction-based loans to large firms over relationship loans to smaller ones.  Stein 
(2002) emphasizes that line managers’ incentives to research a given customer decline 
with increases in bank size and complexity because soft information becomes harder to 
communicate across the bank.  Berger and Udell (2002) argue that monitoring difficulties 
at large institutions tempt relationship managers to overinvest in generating new loans 
and to hide evidence of deterioration in existing loans. 
  Studies of merger events seldom find potential benefits for bank customers.  Scale 
economies in lending appear to exist only at very small banks.  Moreover, only when 
markets are competitive are merger benefits shifted to small customers.  In the United 
States, Strahan and Weston (1998) and Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) find 
small-business lending increases in mergers involving small banks, but decreases when 
large banks combine.  Ely and Robinson (2004) show that large banks with security 
affiliates show significantly smaller proportions of small-business loans than similar 
banks that have no security affiliate.  Carow, Kane and Narayanan (2004) find that the 
megamergers in the U.S. lower the stock prices of small, credit-constrained customers.  
Studies of bank mergers in Norway and Italy uncover similar effects.  Karceski, Ongena 
and Smith (2005) find that bank merger announcements reduce the equity value of small     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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publicly traded Norwegian firms that are customers of the bank being absorbed, with the 
extent of the decline increasing with the size of the target.  In Italian bank mergers, 
Sapienza (2002) finds contract interest rates on bank loans decline when banks with small 
market shares combine, but increase in more-substantive mergers. 
  Apart from size-related lending patterns, small customers could be harmed by 
shrinkage in the number of outlets competing for their funding business.  Diamond 
(1993) argues that firms that have few funding outlets face a threat of inefficient 
liquidation.  The danger is that, when a firm runs short of tangible capital, its creditors 
may ignore intangible going-concern values in deciding between rolling over short-term 
loans and liquidating its collateral.  Houston and James (1996), Detragiache, Garella and 
Guiso (2000) and Degryse and Ongena (2004) establish that firms which already have 
public debt outstanding or have multiple banking relationships are less susceptible to 
hold-up pressure. However, benefits from access to public debt may be swamped if, as 
Drucker and Puri (2005) suggest, banks can link the availability of loans to customers’ 
use of its investment-banking services. Kanatas and Qi (2003) show that bank 
information monopolies increase the cost to a relationship customer of using an unrelated 
investment bank for public capital.  By increasing bargaining power, reduced competitive 
pressure could enable a bank to reduce RC: the value of informational quasi-rents the 
market shifts forward to relationship customers. Customers could lose bargaining power 
in two ways.  First, a customer that seeks funds from the capital market faces a cost from 
not using its relationship bank as its investment banker in the form of a “lemon’s 
discount.”  This discount reflects the market’s fear that the relationship bank might have 
found the customer uncreditworthy.  Second, a bank’s information advantage in 
predicting the timing of customer funding activity may generate limit-pricing 
opportunities.  Empirical studies confirm the importance of these effects. Yasuda (2005) 
and Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2005) find that lending banks disproportionately 
capture the underwriting business of relationship customers.  Consistent with these 
studies, we find that, ceteris paribus, having public debt outstanding reduced abnormal 
returns from FSMA progress events.   
  Political clout tends to increase whenever a bank attains or solidifies its megabank 
status.  On the one hand, increased clout reduces the chance of failure.   Many studies     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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confirm the value of bank durability to customers.   Looking at the 1984 collapse and 
subsequent rescue of Continental Illinois Bank, Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) 
show that customers’ wealth rises and falls with fluctuations in their lending institution’s 
financial health.  Kang and Stulz (2000), Bae, Kang and Lim (2002), and Ongena, Smith 
and Michalsen (2003) show that adverse shocks to national banking systems reduced 
borrower stock prices in Japan, Korea and Norway, respectively.  On the other hand, by 
reducing the effectiveness of regulatory discipline, increased bank clout can hurt 
customers.  Kane (2000) argues that in bank megamergers some of the stock price 
increases experienced by targets and acquirers come from becoming increasingly “Too 
Big to Discipline Adequately.” This contention is reinforced by Penas and Unal’s finding 
(2004) that the yields on the outstanding bonds of acquiring and target megabanks both 
decline. 
  The net effect of FSMA on any individual customer depends on whether the 
passthrough of regulatory subsidies and scope economies generated by growth in bank 
size and product lines outweighs losses from reductions in the customer’s bargaining 
power.  It is reasonable to hypothesize that, except for very large customers, FSMA 
might have strengthened the relative bargaining power of banks.  Credit-constrained 
firms—defined as younger, smaller corporations with a single banking relationship, no 
outstanding public debt and demonstrable financing needs—seem especially vulnerable 
to changes in the balance of bargaining power.  As a bank increases in size and scope, it 
might prefer to charge higher rates to such customers or to finance fewer of their growth 
opportunities.  In this case, as the FSMA advanced through the enactment process, 
concern about the ability of credit-constrained firms to finance positive present-value 
projects would reduce their stock prices and fears of adverse movements in their cost of 
capital and ability to control essential collateral might raise their beta.   
 
3.  Methods 
Event-study methods are an established way to measure the welfare effects of      Draft of October 5, 2005     
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legislation.
 6   Schwert (1981) roots the method's evidential value in the strong likelihood 
that markets are at least weak-form efficient.  If stock prices incorporate relevant 
information as it becomes publicly available, observed changes in stock prices estimate 
changes in wealth and risk exposures occasioned by particular events. 
Wealth effects from "legislative progress" are identified with statistically significant 
deflections from a benchmark trajectory for expected returns on portfolios of stocks in 
selected sectors and subsectors.   Inferences about risk focus on changes in portfolio betas 
between pre-enactment and post-enactment periods. 
A legislative-progress event study begins by designating salient dates at which 
information might have been transmitted to the market.  Next, stakeholder groups 
("sectors") must be identified, and portfolios representative of these groups constructed.  
Finally, a model of pre-event “expected” returns on these portfolios must be developed to 
benchmark “normal” returns for each portfolio on the event days.  How this paper 
proceeds through these steps is described in the next three subsections.   
  
3.1 Legislative progress events 
Prior to the FSMA, banks devised clever ways to cross industry borders and 
regulators subsequently redrew the borders to legitimize most incursions.  Because 
circumventive entry incurs continuing avoidance costs, even banking organizations that 
had successfully smuggled themselves across the borders could benefit from legitimizing 
or widening loopholes. 
Over time, financial institutions’ demand for new powers grew and regulatory 
agencies became increasingly willing to use their rule-making powers to relax statutory 
burdens.  For example, in the mid-1980s, the Federal Reserve Board authorized bank 
holding companies (BHCs) to establish “Section 20” subsidiaries that could underwrite 
previously “bank ineligible” securities activities merely by staying within evolving 
percentage-of-revenue and interaffiliate limits.  On the insurance front, several state 
regulators (e.g., in South Dakota in 1983 and Delaware in 1990) permitted state-chartered 
banks (including institutions owned by out-of-state holding companies) to sell insurance 
                                                 
6 Binder (1997) surveys the use of event-study methods to assess welfare effects from changes in regulatory 
regimes.        Draft of October 5, 2005     
  9
products nationwide.  FSMA firmed up and equalized financial institutions’ rights to 
exercise banking, securities, and insurance powers within a single organization. 
Event-window movements in stock prices are particularly informative when events 
surprise market participants.  The prior interplay of arbitrage-like circumvention and 
regulatory or statutory realignment of charter powers lessened the competitive impact of 
FSMA and the value of the information that legislative-progress events could convey. 
  Prior to 1999, 12 Congresses repelled 12 attempts to pass similar legislation.  On May 
6, 1999, financial-modernization legislation advanced beyond the committee level for the 
first time, winning approval in the Senate.  Our event timeline starts at this date and 
progresses to enactment six months later.  On July 1, the House of Representatives 
approved its own version of the bill.  A joint congressional committee formed to 
reconcile the two versions announced significant progress on October 13, although issues 
of regulatory jurisdiction remained unsettled.  On October 15, the Federal Reserve and 
the Treasury announced that they had settled their jurisdictional issues.  A final obstacle 
was White House insistence that the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) not be 
undermined.  A compromise between the White House and the House and Senate 
conferees surfaced on October 22 and a final conference report was issued on November 
2.  Both chambers passed the bill on November 4 and President Clinton signed the 




3.2 The Sampling Frame 
  Our study samples two broad stakeholder groups: financial firms and their corporate 
customers.  The Center for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) contains 682 
financial-services firms.  We partition these firms into seven subsectors:  268 U.S. banks 
(3-digit SIC code 602 but excluding the 4-digit SIC code 6029 and section 20 banks), 25 
Section 20 banks, 194 thrifts (3-digit SIC 603), 33 finance companies (3-digit SIC 61), 45 
investment banks (3-digit SIC 62), 95 insurance companies, and 22 insurance agencies 
(3-digit SIC 641). 
                                                 
7 Information-generating event dates were identified using the Wall Street Journal Index, New York Times 
Index, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, and prior studies of FSMA.     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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  Our sample of current and prospective customers is drawn from the universe of 
nonfinancial corporations.  To be included in our study, a firm had to meet four data-
availability criteria: 
1.  be traded on either the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, 
  2.  have daily returns available on CRSP during 1999, 
  3.  be traded on at least 70% of the possible trading days, and 
  4.  have balance-sheet and income-statement data on Compustat. 
  
Applying the first three data requirements to the CRSP dataset produced 6803 firms.  The 
Compustat data requirement reduced the number of firms to 3820.  Separating out firms 
whose SIC code (= 6) classifies them as financial companies, and eliminating outliers 
(firms whose event-day return exceeds 15% in absolute value) narrowed the sample to 
3008 customers. 
  To represent the competitiveness of each customer’s funding environment we 
construct the following measures for each customer:
8 
  EFN: External Financing Needs, defined as planned investment minus internally 
generated funding. 
  PUB_DEBT:  an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the firm has public 
bonds outstanding; and is zero otherwise. 
  AGE: Log of number of years that the firm’s stock has been trading publicly.
  
  SIZE: Log of asset size (in $million). 
  MUL_REL: an indicator variable that equals one for customers that have multiple 
banking relationships; and is zero otherwise. 
  SECTION20: an indicator variable that equals one for customers of a bank with a 
section 20 underwriting affiliate; and is zero otherwise. 
  Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) demonstrate that the 
growth of firms in need of external finance depends on the developmental state and 
industrial structure of the financial environment in which firms seeks capital.  Strahan 
and Weston (1998), Berger et al (1998), Karceski, Ongena, and Smith (2004) and 
Sapienza (2002) find that firm size is among the best proxies for customer bargaining 
power.  Kanatas and Qi (2003) identify age as a factor.  Houston and James (1996) and 
                                                 
8  The Appendix describes in a reproducible way how these variables are constructed.     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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Detragiache, Garella, and Guison (2000) show that multiple relationships and the 
presence of public debt mitigate adverse selection and hold-up costs.  Consistent with 
these studies, we define a customer as potentially “credit-constrained” (denoted by a 
CREDIT_CONSTRAINED indicator) when it lies in the less-favorable tail of the 
distribution of each of these five variables.  CREDIT_CONSTRAINED equals one when: 
EFN > 0, 
PUB_DEBT = 0, 
AGE = 10 years or less, 
SIZE < log of $500 Million, 
MUL_REL = 0; and is 0 otherwise. 
This definition yields 722 credit constrained-customers and 2286 credit-unconstrained 
peers. 
 
3.3. Model  
To estimate event returns, we employ the multivariate regression model (MVRM).  
The MVRM model employs Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated regression framework.  
It specifies a simultaneous system of market models (one for each sectoral portfolio), 
explicitly conditioned on the occurrence (nonoccurrence) of the event.  This model 
corrects for heteroskedasticity and for contemporaneous dependence of individual-
equation errors.  This allows us to test differences in sectoral responses to an event as 
well as to overcome problems associated with event-day clustering.
9     
 
The MVRM takes the form: 
(2) 
Parameters and variables are defined as follows: 
jt r  = the return for portfolio j, on day t; 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed explanation of the MVRM and of its advantages in testing the impact of regulatory 
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j α  = the value of the intercept for portfolio j; 
j β  = the systematic risk of portfolio j; 
mt r  = the market return on day t; 
jk γ  = the event-induced shift in the intercept (i.e., the abnormal return) generated by 
event k; 
k D  = a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during the two-day event window for 
event k, but is zero otherwise; 
jt ε  = the error term for portfolio j on day t. 
 
The return on each portfolio j is constructed by weighting the returns of constituent 
firms equally.  The equally weighted CRSP market index serves as the market proxy.  
Returns are observed during a 10 ½-month period running from January 1, 1999 to 
November 15, 1999.  This “event period” encompasses eight specific progress events.  
Event dummies ( k D , k=1, …,8) deviate from zero on the k
th event date and on the 
day following the event.  A two-day event window is selected to account for the diffusion 
of information following the event date.  The coefficient of each Dk ( jk γ ) expresses the 
abnormal return on portfolio j generated by event k.  Net sectoral benefits derived from 
the Act are measured by the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) which sums the  j γ  
responses over all eight events. 
 For the legislative-progress period as a whole, we first test whether CARs differ 
among the sectoral portfolios.  Rejecting the null hypothesis would confirm that financial 
modernization impacted individual-sector portfolios differently.  We also test the 
significance of the sum of CARs across the sectoral portfolios.  Our inability to reject the 
null hypothesis would indicate that, contrary to the Treasury Secretary’s claim, sectoral 
gains and losses generated by the event might be redistributive in nature, neither creating 
nor destroying wealth in the aggregate. 
Changes in a customer’s shadow price for external funding might also increase the 
riskiness of its future earnings.  To test this hypothesis, we investigate whether FSMA     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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also affected customer betas.  This requires that we expand the model to include period-
specific slope and intercept dummies.  The expanded model takes the form: 
            ( 3 )  
In (3), 
EVENT D  = a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 in the event period—from January 1, 
1999 to November 15, 1999; and is zero otherwise. 
POST D  = a binary variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-event period—from 
November 16, 1999 to May 15, 2000; and is zero otherwise. 
Model (3) is estimated over the period July 1, 1998 to May 15, 2000.
10  The specification 
expresses systematic risk in the event period as the sum of  j β +
'
j β , in the post-event 
period as  j β + j β ′ ′ , and the variable BETACHANGEj as j β ′ ′ . 
 
3.4 Cross-sectional tests 
  Whether due to projected changes in relationship value (R) or in bargaining power 
(BP), cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) express the net impact of FSMA on customer-
relationship value (RC). To investigate whether this net effect is significant, we undertake 
a second round of testing.  This round treats individual-customer CARi and 
BETACHANGEi as joint proxies for relationship value (Ri) and bargaining power (BPi).  
Individual-firm CARi and BETACHANGEi are generated in the MVRM regressions as 
parameter estimates for sectoral portfolios. 
Second-round regressions seek to approximate the following latent model: 
                              CARi (or BETACHANGEi) = ai + bi Ri + ci BPi + ui.   (4) 
 
In estimating (4), the joint influence of Ri and BPi is proxied by variables that represent 
the intensity of the competitive and informational environment in which the customer 
                                                 
10 Introducing 6-month intervals on both sides of January 1, 1999 – November 15, 1999 lets us estimate 
shifts in beta and allows us to make inferences about the influence of legislative-progress events on stock-
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must negotiate loan financing.  Parameter estimates presented in our tables are for 
equation (5): 
 
CARi (or BETACHANGEi) = ai + b1SECTION20i + b2EFNi + b3SIZEi + b4PUB_DEBTi 
+ b5MUL_RELi + b6AGEi + 
b7CREDIT_CONSTRAINEDi + ui.          (5) 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Sectoral tests 
  We begin by estimating the MVRM model parsimoniously for two consolidated 
sectors: financial firms and corporate customers.   Table 2 presents the results. Panel A 
shows that the average financial institution gained 1.20% in market value over the 
legislative progress period, but this value does not differ significantly from zero.  Still, 
because 57.48% of the firms in the financial-sector portfolio experience positive 
abnormal returns, we can reject (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis that abnormal 
returns are evenly divided between positive and negative values.  Explaining some of the 
benefits experienced by financial institutions, the average customer lost 2.53% of its 
market capitalization.  Only 43.35% of the customer sample shows a positive CAR.  A 
sign rank test confirms that this percentage differs significantly from 50%. To assess the 
economic significance of these findings, we multiply each firm’s market capitalization at 
the start of the legislative period by its CAR and aggregate across the sector.  Over the 
eight progress events, the financial sector registers a $74 billion or 3.62% gain on its May 
5, 1999’s market capitalization of $2.04 trillion. These returns show that large financial 
firms gained more at the passage of FSMA than their smaller counterparts. The 
corresponding numbers for the customer sector are a $407.2 billion decline and a -4.16% 
loss on an initial capitalization of $9.76 trillion.  
  Panel B shows that both sectors experience significant declines in systematic risk.  
For the financial-sector portfolio, beta declines from 0.90 to 0.37 in the post-event period.  
This decline is significant at the 1% level.  Only 11.29% of the financial firms show an 
increase in beta.  This firmly rejects the hypothesis that, within the financial sector, beta     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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changes are evenly divided.
11  The customer portfolio shows a smaller decline in beta, 
from 1.10 to 0.91.  However, even this smaller decline is significant at 1% because only 
30.49% of the firms experience an upward revision. 
  Results in panel C confirm that event returns experienced by financial institutions 
differ significantly from customer returns.  Both the F-test and the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test reject the null hypothesis that event returns are the same for both sectors.  While 
efficiency gains may exist, an F-test fails to reject the hypothesis  that event returns 
across these consolidated sectors sum to zero.  This indicates that at least some of the 
institutions’ gains are redistributive.  In the aggregate, financial institutions fared better 
than their customers. 
 
4.2 Intrasectoral tests 
  To investigate wealth effects within each of the consolidated sectors, we estimate 
MVRM models for nine subsector portfolios: seven financial-industry subsectors and two 
customer subsectors.  The financial subsectors are: finance companies, insurance 
agencies, thrifts, insurance companies, investment banks, all commercial banks, and 
commercial banks with section 20 security-underwriting affiliates.  The customer 
subsectors distinguish credit-constrained and credit-unconstrained firms.   
  Table 3 disaggregates the financial sector.  Insurance companies, investment banks, 
and commercial banks (the highlighted area of the table) gain value, while insurance 
agencies, finance companies and thrifts lose value.  Similar results are documented by 
Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), Carow and Heron (2002), Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins 
(2002), and Yu (2002).  The easiest way to explain this intrasectoral wealth redistribution 
is to attribute it to expanded opportunities for industry consolidation opened up by 
FSMA.  Investors apparently expected large multiproduct financial institutions to 
improve their competitive position relative to more-specialized industry participants. 
  Table 4 disaggregates the customer subsector.  Both subsectors lose market 
capitalization, but credit-constrained customers suffer more severely (-5.22%) than 
unconstrained firms (-1.68%).  Moreover credit-constrained customers experience an 
                                                 
11 Using a similar estimation period, the reduction in systematic risk for each of the financials sectors is 
also documented in Akhigbe and Whyte (2004).   
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increase in beta from 1.32 in the pre-event period to 1.52 in the post-event period, while 
the unconstrained firms experience a decline in beta from 1.03 to 0.73 over the same time 
period.  Parametric and nonparametric tests confirm that the wealth loss for credit-
constrained customers is significantly greater than for unconstrained customers. 
  Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, although some of the benefits achieved by commercial 
banks, securities firms and insurance companies trace to opportunities to outcompete 
other financial sectors, additional gains came at customer expense and especially from 
small, credit-constrained firms.  
 
4.3 Cross-sectional results 
  Table 5 treats CAR and beta change as endogenous variables for individual firms.  In  
the CAR regression (I), SIZE and the negative effect of CREDIT_CONSTRAINED 
prove significant at the 1% level.  Other things equal, average stock-price revisions are 
less negative for larger firms and more negative for credit-constrained ones.  This is 
predicted by the hypothesis that a customer’s bargaining power increases with its size and 
decreases with funding constraints.  However, the negative sign found for PUB_DEBT 
supports the hypothesis that some of the continuing investment-banking business of 
relationship customers is apt to be disadvantageously forced into the bank. 
  In the BETACHANGE regression (II), many more variables prove significant.  Size 
and credit-constrained variables remain significant, but (as hypothesized) their signs 
reverse.  The EFN coefficient is positive and significant.  In combination with the 
positive sign accorded PUB_DEBT, this further supports the hypothesis that funding 
costs and effective access deteriorate. As in the CAR equation, increases in size can 
overcome adverse effects.  Given the correlation known to exist between the sizes of 
banks and their customers, the negative and significant coefficient for the SECTION20 
dummy (-0.17) reinforces the effects of size in reducing risk at the relatively large firms 
that are customers of the generally large Section 20 banks.  The significantly positive 
coefficient for AGE (0.04) shows that, at the margin, increases in firm age can only 
slightly improve a customer’s bargaining power. 
  Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the stock prices of credit-constrained customers 
declined during FSMA event windows and that credit-constrained customers experienced     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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significant increases in systematic risk in the wake of its enactment.  These findings 
reinforce evidence in the literature on bank mergers that large-bank consolidation is 
unfavorably affecting the price and/or availability of credit for capital-constrained firms. 
 
4.4 Robustness Experiments 
  Tables 6, 7, and 8 explore the sensitivity of our results to variation in sampling 
technique, variable definitions, and model specification.  The qualitative implications of 
the results shown in Table 5 remain unchanged. 
  Sampling Current Customers Only.  Tables 2, 4, and 5 analyze a sample drawn from 
the universe of current and prospective customers.  The first columns of Tables 6 and 7 
report results from sampling from the universe of current customers only. 
  The first column of Table 6 shows that, although slightly stronger in magnitude, the 
values of significant effects on customer CARs are much the same in the restricted 
sample.  However, the first column of Table 7 shows that the usefulness of the beta-
change regression virtually disintegrates.  Only SIZE remains strongly significant and, 
like R
2 and the other previously significant variables, its value is greatly reduced.  Taken 
together, these experiments indicate that established bank customers are expected to be 
financed more reliably and slightly more cheaply than potential customers.   
  Using Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database, we identify firms that 
have an active loan facility with a sample bank that is designated to be either a sole 
lender or a lead lender in a syndicate during the period January 1, 1999 to November 15, 
1999.
 12  As described by Angzabo, Mei and Saunders (1998), an originating institution is 
a lead lender in a syndicate if it retains primary administrative, monitoring and contract-
enforcement responsibilities along with (typically) the largest stake in the loan.  Other 
institutions in the syndicate are either managers or participants.  Managers usually 
perform minor administrative duties and hold much smaller stakes in the loan than lead 
lenders.  Participants function only as signatories to the loan agreement and entities that 
fund a piece of the loan.  According to Yasuda (2005) “lending relationships” are highly 
                                                 
12 The Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database provides details of loans over $100,000 
compiled from 13Ds, 14Ds, 13Es, 10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks, and S-series (registration) statements that publicly 
held companies and privately held companies with public debt outstanding file with the Securities 
Exchange Commission.     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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correlated with the hierarchy of shareholdings in the syndicate: lead lenders are typically 
relationship banks; participants are merely invited to help fund the loan by the lead 
lenders; and managers stand somewhere in between. 
  Identifying lead lenders by titles such as arranger, co-arranger, administrative agent, 
agent or co-agent, and imposing the data requirements specified earlier, yields a sample 
of 1218 nonfinancial customers.  This subsample of relationship customers omits weaker 
and developing relationships.   While imposing these restrictions has the obvious 
advantage of identifying established relationship customers, it has the disadvantage of 
increasing the proportion of large firms (already an issue in sampling from the Dealscan 
universe) and reducing the number of credit-constrained customers.
13  Although results 
from either sample remain qualitatively similar, the restricted sampling strategy reduces 
the power of tests of the hypothesis that small, credit-constrained firms suffer 
disproportionately from the enactment of FSMA. 
 Alternative  Specifications.  Industry type might affect both the character of a firm’s 
credit needs and the availability of assets that can serve as collateral.  Although R
2 
improves, we find no qualitative differences from our benchmark results when we control 
in Tables 6 or 7 for industry type with either one or two-digit SIC indicators.  The last 
column of each table introduces four other control variables: Tobin’s Q, the debt-to-asset 
ratio, and indicators for dividends and for research & development expense.  Although 
each of these further controls is significant in one equation or the other, the signs of all 
coefficients that proved significant in Table 5 remain the same. In only one case (namely, 
for PUB_DEBT in the CAR equation) does any coefficient become insignificant.  
Finally, although not reported here, the pattern of significant results proves much the 
same when we use value-weighted market returns instead of equally-weighted market 
returns to calibrate abnormal returns and betas.   
  Redefining Credit Constraint.  Credit-constrained customers are firms that lack 
internal resources for financing planned investment expenditures and promise as well to 
have difficulty meeting their need for external funding.  Our indicator for credit 
                                                 
13 The number of credit-constrained customers in the restricted sample of 1218 “LPC” customers is 168 (or 
13.8%).  This compares to 722 (or 24.0%) credit-constrained customers in the primary sample of 3008 
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constraint combines the impact of facing a funding gap with four measures of the 
potential narrowness of the firm’s funding environment.   
  The literature offers two alternative strategies for classifying firms as financially 
constrained. The first strategy is to look for a single characteristic that might signal 
financing constraint.  Particular characteristics that others have used to classify a firm as 
financially constrained include: small size [Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)]; the absence of a 
bond rating [Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994)]; and dividend distributions [Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1998)].  
  The second approach combines several firm characteristics into an endogenous 
classification model: for example, conditioning the retention ratio on Tobin’s Q as in 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) or constructing indices as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and 
Whited and Wu (2005).  Size and the presence of public debt (and hence a bond rating) 
already appear in our regressions.   
  Korajczyk and Levy’s (2003) classification scheme embodies the idea that since 
dividends and security repurchases compete for funds with investments, firms with 
attractive investment opportunities and high agency costs for external finance may be 
expected to retain net income for investment purposes.  Conditioning on Tobin’s Q helps 
to ensure that resource-constrained firms have meaningful investment opportunities and 
are not financially distressed.  Applied to our sample, Korajczyk and Levy’s measure of 
financial constraint classifies 901 firms as financially constrained.  Table 8 shows that 
these firms experience larger negative abnormal returns and larger positive beta changes 
than firms classified as unconstrained.  Introducing the KL measure along with CREDIT-
CONSTRAINED into the abnormal-return and beta-change regressions increases our 
model’s explanatory power, but does not render CREDIT-CONSTRAINED insignificant.       
  Whited and Wu (2005) use GMM to estimate an intertemporal model of investment 
and financial frictions that correlates better with CREDIT-CONSTRAINED than with the 
other two indices.  Whited and Wu interpret their index as a shadow price for external 
finance to which every firm must adjust in equilibrium. They show that their index meets 
the test of being a priced factor in a Fama-French model.  When we restrict our sample to 
the 2210 firms that report the data needed to construct Whited and Wu’s measure or the 
2199 firms that report data needed to construct Kaplan and Zingales’ measure, credit-    Draft of October 5, 2005     
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constrained firms continue to show significantly lower FSMA event returns and 
significantly higher post-FSMA systematic risk.   
5. Summary and implications 
Previous investigations of event returns associated with the FSMA and piecemeal 
loophole expansions show stock-price benefits for banks, investment banks, and 
insurance companies.  Such gains are strongly predicted by partial-equilibrium analysis.  
The intensity of prior lobbying activity shows that at least some of the abandoned 
constraints on product offerings had inefficiently limited institutions’ ability to use their 
private information, contracting skills, and scope economies.  Removing these binding 
constraints should permit affected institutions to exploit private information on clients to 
design, market, and price their product lines more effectively than before.  In general 
equilibrium, however, the benefits that favored financial institutions win from exercising 
their new freedoms must be weighed against losses that might develop elsewhere in the 
economy.   
Given how stubbornly Congress resisted previous efforts to repeal product-line 
restrictions, it is clear that important sectors had an economic stake in their continuance.  
Economic theory indicates that expanding the scope of institutional charters might 
expand opportunities for very large banks to extract rents both from informational 
advantages and from size-related safety-net subsidies.  Our findings strongly reject the 
hypothesis that abnormal returns generated by FSMA events were entirely or even mainly 
due to gains in efficiency. Our data show that favored sectors’ gains from FSMA not only 
came from decreases in the aggregate value of the stock of vulnerable customers, but also 
that losses at nonfinancial firms far outstripped financial firms’ gains.   
That small, credit-constrained firms suffer negative event returns reinforces 
popular fears that the worldwide consolidation of the financial industry adversely affects 
capital-constrained firms. Happily, a notable surge in the flow of banking charters 
awarded in the U.S. supports the hypothesis that, over time, new entrants are seizing the 
opportunity to service such firms.  Many of these new banking enterprises reclaim 
intangible relationship capital by employing bank executives whose jobs had evaporated 
in a prior consolidation.       Draft of October 5, 2005     
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Table 1:  Legislative Progress Events 
 
 
Event Date  Event 
   
May 6, 1999  Senate approves Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (S.900) 55-44.  
President Clinton threatens a veto over provisions concerning the Community 
Reinvestment Act. 
 
July 1, 1999  House of Representatives approves H.R.10 by margin of 343-86. 
 
October 13, 1999  Significant progress in reconciling the House and Senate bills is announced. 
 
October 15, 1999  Federal Reserve and Treasury Department announce agreement on 
responsibility for regulating Financial Holding Companies and bank 
subsidiaries. 
 
October 22, 1999  Early-morning negotiations eliminate the threat of a presidential veto.  White 
House and Conference Committee agree on compromise provisions.  
 
November 2, 1999  Conference report is signed by majority of conferees, clearing the way for 
floor votes in the House and Senate. 
 
November 4, 1999  Financial Services Modernization Act passes the Senate 90-8 and the House 
362-57. 
 
November 12, 1999  President Clinton signs the Financial Services Modernization Act. 
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Table 2: Intersectoral tests  
 
Abnormal returns and changes in beta are computed using a multivariate regression model.  To compute 
abnormal returns, a benchmark model is estimated using returns from January 1, 1999 to November 15, 
1999.  A benchmark for Beta changes is estimated by adding an additional 6 months of returns on either 
side of the abnormal return estimation period, i.e. from July 1, 1998 to May 15, 2000.  
 
 Financial  Customers 
    
Number of Companies  682  3008 
     
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
    
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR)  1.20%  -2.53% 
t-statistic for H0 : CAR = 0  0.66  -3.30*** 
    
Percent positive CARs   57.48  43.35 
z-statistic for H0 : % positive CAR = 50%  3.91***  -7.29*** 
  
Panel B: Systematic Risk (beta) 
    
Pre-beta (7/1/98 – 12/31/98)  0.90  1.10 
Post-beta (11/16/99 – 5/15/00)  0.37  0.92 
t-statistic for H0 : beta change (pre to post) = 0   -12.09***  -9.63*** 
    
Percent positive beta changes   11.29%  30.49% 
z-statistic for H0 : % positive beta changes = 50%  -20.22***  -21.41*** 
    
Panel C: Cross-sectoral hypotheses tests 
  
 p-value of F-test for H0 : CAR for financial portfolio 
= CAR for customer portfolio 
0.0248 
  
 p-value of Wilcoxon rank sum test for H0 : CAR for 
financial portfolio = CAR for customer portfolio 
< 0.0001 
    
p-value of F-test for H0 : CAR for financial portfolio 




*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3: Intrasectoral Differences within the Financial Sector 
 






*** Significant at the 1% level 
* Significant at the 10% level














Number of firms  33  22  95  45  268  25 194 
             
            
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)  -5.15%  -0.80%  5.33%  3.40%  1.22%  2.23% -0.18% 
 t-statistic for H0 : CAR = 0   -1.22  -0.22  1.99*  0.80  0.63  0.33 -0.11 
             
Percent positive CARs   33.33  31.82  76.8%  62.22  60.08  68.00 48.97 
z-statistic for H0 : % positive CAR = 50%  -1.91*  -1.71*  5.23***  1.64  3.30***  1.80* -0.29 
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Table 4: Differences within the Customer Sector 
 
Abnormal returns and changes in beta are computed using a multivariate regression model.  To compute 
abnormal returns, the model is estimated using returns from January 1, 1999 to November 15, 1999.  Beta 
changes are benchmarked by adding an additional 6 months of returns on either side of the abnormal-return 
estimation period, i.e. from July 1, 1998 to May 15, 2000.  
 





Number of firms  722  2286 
    
Panel A : Abnormal Returns    
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)  -5.22%  -1.68% 
 t-statistic for H0 : CAR = 0   -3.55***  -1.49 
    
Percent positive CARs   38.92  44.75 
z-statistic for H0 : % positive CAR = 
50% 
-5.95*** -5.02*** 
    
Panel B: Systematic Risk    
Pre-beta (7/1/98 – 12/31/98)  1.32  1.03 
Post-beta (11/16/99 – 5/15/00)  1.52  0.73 
t-statistic for beta change from pre to 
post  
5.59*** -10.86*** 
    
Percent positive beta changes   49.17  24.58 
z-statistic for H0 : % positive beta 
changes = 50% 
-0.45 -24.30*** 
    
Panel C: Cross –sectoral hypotheses 
tests 
  
p-value for F test and Wilcoxon rank 
sum test for H0: CAR for constrained 
customers = CAR for unconstrained 
customers 
0.1111,   < 0. 0001 
  
p-value for F-test and Wilcoxon rank 
sum test for H0: beta changes for 
constrained customers = beta changes 
for unconstrained customers 
< 0.0001,   < 0.0001 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional analysis of customers 
 
Abnormal returns and changes in beta are estimated using a multivariate regression model.  To compute 
abnormal returns, the model is estimated using returns from January 1, 1999 to November 15, 1999.  Beta 
changes are benchmarked by adding an additional 6 months of returns on either side of the abnormal return 
estimation period, i.e. from July 1, 1998 to May 15, 2000.   Variable definitions are provided in the 




  I II 
    
Intercept -0.0521  0.3006 
  (-5.26)***     (4.81)*** 
    
SECTION20 -0.0011  -0.1729 
  (-0.20)      (-5.33)*** 
    
EFN -0.0003  0.0164 
  (-0.51)     (3.94)*** 
    
SIZE  0.0062  -0.1066 
  (3.65)***     (-10.16)*** 
    
PUB_DEBT -0.0113  0.0693 
  (-1.97)**    (2.14)** 
    
MUL_REL -0.0034  0.0393 
 (-0.54)  (1.10) 
    
AGE 0.0012  0.0355 
 (0.56)    (2.89)*** 
    
CREDIT_CONSTRAINED  -0.0216  0.1407 
  (-4.02)***     (3.13)*** 
    
Number of Observations  3008  3008 
R-squared 0.0197  0.1313 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0174  0.1292 
P-value on F-stat  <.0001  <.0001 
    
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests of the cross-sectional model of cumulative abnormal returns 
This table summarizes robustness tests of the model of cumulative abnormal returns.  The endogenous variable 
is the cumulative abnormal return over the eight events listed in Table 1.  Each column provides incremental 
evidence about robustness.  Model 1 restricts the sample to firms where LPC data are available. We interpret 
this as “sampling current customers only.”  Model 2 respecifies the CAR model
 to include a series of indicator 
variables identifying the one-digit SIC code of the company.  Industry effects as well as intercepts are not 
shown in the table. Model 3 respecifies the indicator variables to identify the two-digit SIC code of the 
company.  Again, industry effects and intercepts are not shown in the table.  Model 4 includes additional 
Compustat variables as control variables.  TOBINQ  equals the market value of assets divided by book value of 
assets (data6-data60+data24*data25)/data6. DEBT_ASSET equals the total debt divided by assets (data9 / 
data6).  R&D is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has research and development expenditures (data46  
> 0; 0 otherwise).  DIVIDEND is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends on their common 
stock (data26  > 0; 0 otherwise).  TOBINQ and DEBT_ASSET are winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








Intercept  -0.0633     -0.0411 
  (-3.66)***     (-3.75)*** 
SIZE  0.0068  0.0056  0.0052  0.0049 
 (2.40)**  (3.22)***  (3.00)***  (2.71)*** 
SECTION20  0.0129  0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0016 
 (1.29)  (0.10)  (-0.03)  (-0.28) 
PUB_DEBT  -0.0209  -0.0096  -0.0070  -0.0094 
 (-2.46)**  (-1.53)  (-1.11)  (-1.45) 
MUL_REL  -0.0005  -0.0033  -0.0034  -0.0014 
 (-0.07)  (-0.49)  (-0.50)  (-0.21) 
EFN  0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0001 
 (0.15)  (-0.63)  (-0.73)  (-0.11) 
AGE -0.0005  0.0015  0.0007  -0.0014 
 (-0.15)  (0.70)  (0.31)  (-0.60) 
CREDIT_CONSTRAINED  -0.0258  -0.0211  -0.0223  -0.0204 
  (-2.40)**  (-3.31)***  (-3.49)***  (-3.15)*** 
TOBINSQ       -0.0027 
       (-2.00)** 
DEBT_ASSET       -0.0119 
       (-0.91) 
R&D       0.0070 
       (1.60) 
DIVIDEND       0.0155 
       (2.86)*** 
Number of Observations  1218 3008  3008 2920 
R-squared  0.0179  0.0297  0.0526  0.0239 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0122 0.0248  0.0376 0.0202 
P-value on F-stat  <.0026 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
*** Significant at the 1% level   ** Significant at the 5% level     Draft of October 5, 2005     
  31
Table 7 
Robustness tests of the cross-sectional model of changes in beta 
This table summarizes robustness tests related to the model explaining changes in beta. Beta changes are 
benchmarked by comparing the beta estimated for 6 months of returns prior to the legislative period to the beta 
estimated for the 6 months following the legislative period.  Each column provides evidence about robustness.  
Model 1 restricts the sample to firms for which LPC data are available. We interpret this as “sampling current 
customers only.”  Model 2 respecifies the CAR model
 to include a series of indicator variables identifying the 
one-digit SIC code of the company.  Model 3 respecifies the indicator variables to identify the two-digit SIC 
code of the company.  Industry effects and intercepts are not shown in the table for models 2 and 3.  Model 4 
includes additional Compustat variables as control variables.  TOBINQ equals the market value of assets 
divided by book value of assets (data6-data60+data24*data25)/data6. DEBT_ASSET equals the total debt 
divided by assets (data9 / data6).  R&D is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has research and 
development expenditures (data46  > 0; 0 otherwise).  DIVIDEND is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 




  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








Intercept  0.0764     0.1169 
  (0.79)     (1.77)* 
SIZE  -0.0702  -0.1012  -0.0953  -0.0907 
 (-4.43)***  (-9.55)***  (-9.08)***  (-8.30)*** 
SECTION20  -0.1078  -0.1648  -0.1514  -0.1081 
 (-1.94)*  (-4.82)***  (-4.50)***  (-3.14)*** 
PUB_DEBT  0.0173 0.0508  0.0688 0.0665 
 (0.37)  (1.32)  (1.82)*  (1.71)* 
MUL_REL  -0.0160  0.0367  0.0197  0.0303 
 (-0.40)  (0.89)  (0.49)  (0.73) 
EFN  -0.0049  0.0183  0.0143  0.0161 
 (-0.82)  (5.46)***  (4.32)***  (4.67)*** 
AGE 0.0316  0.0340  0.0313  0.0328 
 (1.83)*  (2.61)***  (2.40)**  (2.37)** 
CREDIT_CONSTRAINED  0.0569  0.1239  0.1280  0.1307 
  (0.95)  (3.17)***  (3.33)***  (3.37)*** 
TOBINSQ       0.0072 
       (0.90) 
DEBT_ASSET       -0.1771 
       (-2.25)** 
R&D       0.2868 
       (10.87)*** 
DIVIDEND       -0.0530 
       (-1.63) 
Number of Observations  1218 3008  3008 2920 
R-squared  0.0458  0.1578  0.2082  0.1781 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0403 0.1536  0.1956 0.1750 
P-value on F-stat  <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
*** Significant at the 1% level   ** Significant at the 5% level   ** Significant at the 10% level     Draft of October 5, 2005     
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Table 8 
Correlations Between Alternative Measures of Financial Constraint 
Given that all three alternative measures of financial constraint are composites of the control variables used 
in our cross-sectional regression models, the original control variables are collinear with each of the 
alternative measures.  For this reason, we do not report cross-sectional regressions using the alternative 
measures.  The upper portion of the correlation table describes the bivariate correlation that exists between 
the four measures of financial constraints.  The lower portion of the table reports the correlations that the 
different measures have with abnormal returns and changes in beta.  We note that, unlike the other indices, 
Whited and Wu’s (2005) index of financial constraint is an inverse measure.  Hence, all indices show that 
financially constrained firms have lower abnormal returns and larger increases in systematic risk.  Whited 
and Wu’s (2005) measure represents financial constraint as [-.062*(debt to assets) + .010*(indicator for 
positive dividends) + .067*(1 plus the growth in the firm’s sales) + .060*(log of assets) - .043*(1 plus the 
growth in industry sales) + .053*(cash flow to assets)].  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) measure financial 
constraint as [-1.001909*(cash flow to assets) + 3.139193*(debt to assets) - 39.36780*(dividends to assets) 
- 1.314759*(liquid cash to assets) + .2826389*(Tobin’s Q)].  Korajczyk and Levy (KL) (2003, p.82) define 
a firm as financially constrained if: “(1)the firm does not have a net repurchase of debt or equity and does 
not pay dividends within the event window, and (2) its Tobin’s Q, (defined as the sum of the market value 
of equity and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of assets), at the end of the event 
quarter…[is] greater than one.”  As an indicator variable, the KL index correlates more closely with our 
indicator that the other indices.   
 













         
Alternative measures of financial constraint 
         
Credit   3008  1.0000  -0.2338  0.1025  0.2723 
Constrained       <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
         
Whited  &  2210  -0.2338 1.0000 0.0778 -0.3188 
Wu   <.0001    <.0003  <.0001 
         
Kaplan  &  2199  0.1025 0.0778 1.0000  0.3626 
Zingales     <.0001  <.0003    <.0001 
         
Korajczyk &  2236  0.4774  -0.1916  0.2685  1.0000 
Levy    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
         
Correlations with abnormal returns and changes in beta 
          
CAR 3008  -0.1197  0.0578  -0.0462  -0.1029 
   <.0001  0.0065  0.0302  0.0001 
          
BETA_CHANGE 3008 0.2305  -0.1898  -0.0876  0.1249 
   <.0001  <.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
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CAR  The Cumulative Abnormal return over each of the eight events listed in Table 1.   
Each event window combines the day of the event with the day following the 
announcement. Values winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles are used in cross-
sectional tests.   
  
BETACHANGE  Calculated change in beta between the six-month period preceding the January 1, 
1999 (7/1/98 to 12/31/98) and the six-month period following the passage of 
FSMA (11/15/99 to 5/15/00).  Values winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles are 
used in cross-sectional tests.   
 
  
EFN  The average value found for external financing needs during the last 3 years.  
External financing needs are defined as planned investments – internally available 
funds (From COMPUSTAT (data128 - (data18 + data14) + (data3 - data3a) + 
(data2 - data2a) - (data70 - data70a) - (data71 - data71a))/data128.  If less than 3 





SECTION20  An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a customer of a section 20 bank 
and is 0 otherwise.  Section 20 banks are identified from the Federal Reserve web-
site. 
  
PUB_DEBT  An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has public debt outstanding and is 0 
otherwise. The presence of public debt is identified from COMPUSTAT. 
  
SIZE  The log value of the firm’s assets in $millions (COMPUSTAT data6), winsorized 




AGE  The log of the number of years that the company has been listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ as identified from CRSP.  The maximum number of years 
was set at 25. 
  
MUL_REL  An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one banking 
relationship during the period January 1, 1999 to November 15, 1999, and is 0 
otherwise.  Identified from LPC Dealscan database. 
  
CREDIT_CONSTAINED  An indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is credit-constrained 
and 0 otherwise.  Credit-constrained customers are firms that have EFN >0, 
PUB_DEBT = 0, AGE < Log of 11 years, SIZE < Log of $500 million and 
MUL_REL = 0.       Draft of October 5, 2005     
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Appendix A 
Aggregate Gains and Losses for Financial and Nonfinancial Firms 
 
In the table below, we show our estimates of the aggregate gains and losses for financial and nonfinancial firms.  In the most recently available 
Census report prior to the passage of FSMA, Enterprise Statistics 1992, “Table 4, Company Statistics by Receipt Size: 1992” 
[http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/es-9201.pdf], we obtain the number of public and private firms in the financial and nonfinancial industries.  
For each firm in our dataset, we define the dollar impact as the cumulative abnormal return of the individual firm multiplied by the firm’s market 
capitalization on May 5, 1999.  We separate our CRSP and Compustat data into receipt categories as defined in the Census report and for each 
category calculate the median dollar impact.  To obtain the total industry impact, we multiply the number of firms reported in the census report by 
the median dollar impact from our sample and sum the values across the receipt categories.  Due to the small number of observations in CRSP 
and Compustat for firms under $2.5 million in receipts, we omit these firms from this analysis.  Given that smaller, more credit constrained 













































2.5 - 4.9  170,104  158,994 31 ($1,751)  ($278,462,092) 11,110  4 1,119  12,431,090 
5 - 9.9  94,547  88,156 75 (1,233)  (108,669,901) 6,391  12 (47)  (302,186) 
10 - 24.9  60,999  56,652 187 (679)  (38,451,639) 4,347  64 (225)  (979,205) 
25 - 49.9  19,982  18,522 233 (881)  (16,316,697) 1,460  102 (141)  (206,205) 
50 - 99.9  9,220  8,381 305 (599)  (5,024,159)  839  116 993  833,204  
100 - 249  5,028  4,468 518 (2,167)  (9,681,262) 560  127 1,734  970,878   
250 - 499  1,761  1,494 389 (2,615)  (3,906,138) 267  70 17,703  4,726,621   
500 - 1000  954  796 347 (2,888)  (2,299,007)  158  54 9,523  1,504,609  
1000 - 2500  645  522 363 (2,081)  (1,086,292)  123  40 62,800  7,724,345  
>2500 452  356 343 (9,747) (3,469,978)  96  68 385,361  36,994,620   
Totals 363,692  338,341 2,791   ($467,367,165)   25,351 657   $63,697,770 
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Appendix A [Table omits the first two categories for Financial Firms, due to small sample size] 
Estimates of FSMA-Induced Aggregate Gains and Losses Across the Populations of US Financial and 
Nonfinancial Firms 
 
This table shows our estimates of the aggregate gains and losses for financial and nonfinancial firms.  From the most recently available Census 
report prior to the passage of FSMA, Enterprise Statistics 1992, “Table 4, Company Statistics by Receipt Size: 1992” 
[http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/es-9201.pdf], we obtain the number of public and private firms in the financial and nonfinancial industries.  
For each firm in our dataset, we define the dollar impact as the cumulative abnormal return of the individual firm multiplied by the firm’s market 
capitalization on May 5, 1999.  We separate CRSP and Compustat data into ten receipt classes used in the Census report and for each category 
calculate the median dollar impact.  To estimate the total industry impact, we multiply the number of firms reported in the census report by the 
median dollar impact shown in our sample and sum the values across the receipt categories.  Due to the small number of observations in CRSP 
and Compustat for firms under $2.5 million in receipts, we omit these firms from this analysis.  Because smaller, more credit-constrained 













































2.5 - 4.9  170,104  158,994 31 ($1,751) ($278,462,092)  11,110  4 Insufficient    
5 - 9.9  94,547  88,156 75 (1,233)  (108,669,901)  6,391  12 Data   
10 - 24.9  60,999  56,652 187 (679)  (38,451,639) 4,347  64 (225)  (979,205) 
25 - 49.9  19,982  18,522 233 (881)  (16,316,697) 1,460  102 (141)  (206,205) 
50 - 99.9  9,220  8,381 305 (599)  (5,024,159)  839  116 993  833,204  
100 - 249  5,028  4,468 518 (2,167)  (9,681,262) 560  127 1,734  970,878   
250 - 499  1,761  1,494 389 (2,615)  (3,906,138) 267  70 17,703  4,726,621   
500 - 1000  954  796 347 (2,888)  (2,299,007)  158  54 9,523  1,504,609  
1000 - 2500  645  522 363 (2,081)  (1,086,292)  123  40 62,800  7,724,345  
>2500 452  356 343 (9,747) (3,469,978)  96  68 385,361  36,994,620   
Totals 363,692  338,341 2,791   ($467,367,165)   25,351 657   $51,568,866 
 
 